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This article examines outsiders' relative access to occupational level
family‐friendly policies. I use data from the European Working
Conditions Survey of 2015 across 30 European countries examining
workers' access to two types of family‐friendly working‐time
arrangements (WTAs): flexitime, and time off work for personal rea-
sons. The article focuses on women with care responsibilities given
that their demands for family‐friendly policies, as well as their out-
comes, have been shown to be distinct from the rest of the working
population. In addition to the outsider definition used in the labor
market dualization and occupational segmentation literature, i.e.,
low‐skilled workers and those without a permanent contract, this
article also defines outsiders as those perceiving their job as inse-
cure. The results of the analysis show a segmentation between
workers in their access to family‐friendly policies. Unlike statutory
policies, occupational policies seem to be selectively provided
mostly to workers where employers have a vested interest, i.e.,
insiders, resulting in a dualized system for most countries. However,
rather than their contract status, the skill‐level of the job/workers,
and their perceived insecurity were found to be important. The
results further show that although Northern European and some
continental European countries are those where family‐friendly
WTAs are more readily available, it is in these countries where the
division between insiders and outsiders is the greatest. The results
of the article contribute to the literature by showing a need to move
beyond the national level when examining family‐friendly policies,
and to examine a more diverse definition of outsiders when examin-
ing dualization of working conditions.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
With the increase of women's labor market participation, and dual‐earner families, a large and increasing number of
workers across Europe struggle to balance work with family life (Chung, 2017b). Given the negative consequence
such conflict can have on the individual, his or her family and company, as well as for society more broadly (Frone,
Russell, & Cooper, 1992), this is an issue that should not be ignored. Accordingly, many studies examine the cross‐
national variation of family‐friendly policies or the extent to which policies support a dual‐earner/carer system (e.g.,
Korpi, Ferrarini, & Englund, 2013; Saxonberg, 2013), with much of the focus on comparing national level policies—i.e.,
parental leaves and childcare provision. Although national level policies are important when examining the support
available for parents, it is also crucial to examine occupational welfare (see also, Kvist & Greve, 2011; Seeleib‐Kaiser
& Fleckenstein, 2009). At the company level, they may restrict or expand the existing national level regulations,
defining the “final availability” workers actual have towards various arrangements (Chung & Tijdens, 2013; Lambert
& Haley‐Lock, 2004). In addition, companies may provide various additional arrangements through occupational
policies which are not set out in the national level agreements that are crucial in addressing reconciliation needs of
workers (Davis & Kalleberg, 2006; Farnsworth, 2004; Kelly et al., 2014). Yet, studies examining occupational welfare
have traditionally focused on occupational pensions and other types of arrangements as noted in the introduction to
this issue (see also Seeleib‐Kaiser & Fleckenstein, 2009).
The question raised in this article is who has access to occupational level family‐friendly policies, and whether we
find a segmentation in the labor force in the access. Unlike statutory policies, companies have more discretion over
whether to provide occupational family‐friendly policies, as well as to whom to provide them. Companies may provide
additional arrangements to ensure the recruitment and maintenance of workers with additional family demands, as
well as to maintain workers' loyalty and commitment (Dex & Scheibl, 2001; Wood, De Menezes, & Lasaosa, 2003).
The use of such occupational policies may be performance‐driven (Ortega, 2009), resulting in the stratification within
organizations in the access workers get to family‐friendly policies (Chung, 2017a; Lambert & Haley‐Lock, 2004). In
other words, employers may only provide family‐friendly policies to the select few that employers expect a return
from (Swanberg, Pitt‐Catsouphes, & Drescher‐Burke, 2005) or those they are willing to keep/recruit (Wood et al.,
2003). Using the dualization literature (Emmenegger, Häusermann, Palier, & Seeleib‐Kaiser, 2012; Schwander &
Häusermann, 2013), and organization segmentation literature (Lambert & Haley‐Lock, 2004), this article examines
the access to occupational family‐friendly policies of insiders vs. outsiders. In addition to the more commonly used
definition of outsiders, i.e., those without a permanent contract and low‐skilled workers, the article also defines
outsiders as those who feel insecure about their jobs, given the importance of subjective perceptions in detecting
the complex condition the worker is actually placed in.
Of the various types of family‐friendly policies, this article focuses on twoworking‐time arrangements (WTAs), i.e.,
flexitime and time off work for personal reasons. These family‐friendly WTAs are unique in that they are used both for
performance‐enhancing and work–family integration goals (Goodstein, 1994), are crucial for women in maintaining
their labor market position after childbirth (Chung & Van der Horst, 2018), and are the most commonly used type of
occupational level family‐friendly arrangements across Europe (Chung, 2017b). The article examines how national level
contexts shape workers' access to, and the division between workers in their access to, family‐friendly WTAs.
Lastly, this article contributes to the literature by focusing on women with care responsibilities. Previous literature
on occupational family‐friendly policies has examined the working population as a whole. We know from the literature
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that women aremuchmore likely to be responsible for household and care roles (Dotti Sani & Treas, 2016), and that the
use of, and demand for, family‐friendly arrangements is different for men and women (Singley & Hynes, 2005), and for
those with and without care responsibilities (Wanrooy et al., 2013). Thus, it is important to examine women with care
demands separately to understand how their work–family integration demands are met through occupational policies.
Themain questions addressed in this article are, therefore, which femaleworkerswith care demands are able to access
family‐friendly WTAs, whether there is an access gap between insiders and outsiders, and whether it varies across coun-
tries due to institutional contexts. These questions will be answered through the use of the EuropeanWorking Conditions
Survey (EWCS) of 2015 and a multilevel approach. Section 2 explains what is meant by family‐friendly WTAs, and exam-
ines key literature and theories on the provision of these arrangements. Dualization and organizational segmentation the-
ories are examined to help us understand the segmentation in the access to family‐friendly arrangements provided at the
occupational level. Section 3 examines the data and variables used, as well as themethodologies applied in the article. Sec-
tion 4 presents the analysis results, and section 5 makes some final concluding remarks and suggestions for future studies.
2 | THEORY
2.1 | Defining family‐friendly working‐time arrangements
In this article, I examine two types of flexible WTAs:1 flexitime—the ability to alter the times workers start and end
work, which can lead to the ability to change the number of hours worked; and time off work, i.e., the ability to take
time off during working hours to meet personal demands. Work–family border theory (Clark, 2000) and boundary
management theory (Kossek, Lautsch, & Eaton, 2005) argue that flexibility in your work can help facilitate the
integration of work and home roles by allowing workers to adapt the borders of one domain around the demands
of others—in this case, adapting the timing of work around family demands. In fact, several empirical studies show
how flexible working is used, especially by women, to address various family demands (Maume, 2006; Singley &
Hynes, 2005). Further, flexible working has been shown to relieve work–family conflict, i.e., the conflict workers feel
due to the competing demands coming from work and family (e.g., Chung, 2011; Kelly et al., 2014), although others
have argued that the effect is minimal (Allen, Johnson, Kiburz, & Shockley, 2013; Michel, Kotrba, Mitchelson, Clark,
& Baltes, 2011). Flexible working‐time has also been shown to reduce labor turnover or turnover intentions of
workers (de Menezes & Kelliher, 2011) by increasing the fit between work and family life (McNall, Masuda, & Nicklin,
2009). In fact, family‐friendly WTAs are frequently used by employers as a recruitment and maintenance tool to
attract and keep workers—especially those with higher skills (Davis & Kalleberg, 2006).
Flexible WTAs are used not only to increase family friendliness of the company, but also to enhance its performance
(Ortega, 2009). Givingworkers more control over their work can be used as a part of a high‐involvement system (Wood&
deMenezes, 2010) or high performance strategy which aims to increase performance by giving workers more discretion
and influence over their work (Appelbaum, 2000; Davis & Kalleberg, 2006). Providing workers with more control over
their work has been shown to make workers work harder and longer (Kelliher & Anderson, 2010; Lott & Chung, 2016)
and have been linked to increased performance outcomes for companies (de Menezes & Kelliher, 2011).
2.2 | Dualization and division of working conditions between workers
The main idea behind dual labor market theory (e.g., Doeringer & Piore, 1975; Lindbeck & Snower, 1989) is that labor
markets are divided into primary and secondary sectors, with limited mobility between the two (see Davidsson &
Naczyk, 2009). The main purposes of this division is to keep a primary workforce that secures the core skills of the
company, while relying on the secondary market to adjust to cyclical demands and fluctuations. Thus, workers in
the primary workforce, the “insiders”, enjoy high wages, good working conditions, prospects for career advancement,
and job stability. Workers in the secondary market, the “outsiders”, have jobs with low‐pay, bad working conditions,
few career advancement prospects, and work that is unstable with risks of frequent lay‐offs (Doeringer & Piore,
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1975, pp. 70–71; Rueda, 2014). It is not surprising that outsiders are less likely to get investment from employers,
such as work‐related training (Arulampalam & Booth, 1998; Lambert & Haley‐Lock, 2004), most likely because
employers do not expect high returns from this section of the workforce (Osterman, 1999).
It is important to note the different definitions of outsiders in the literature. Some of the earlier works on dual
labor markets distinguish between those in and out of employment (e.g., Blanchard & Summers, 1987; Lindbeck &
Snower, 1986). More recently, the focus has been on the relative vulnerability of workers, outsiders defined as
those with atypical contracts, i.e., temporary and involuntary part time, and non‐unionized workers (e.g.,
Emmenegger, 2009; Rueda, 2005). Some scholars (Biegert, 2014; Schwander & Häusermann, 2013) argue that
definitions of outsiders based on employment status are too static, and that the fluidity of positions and mobility
between the two segments should to be taken into account. Schwander and Häusermann (2013) thus propose to
use occupational categories to indicate employment biographies. Lastly, Chung (2016) argues that rather than objec-
tive insecurity statuses, subjectively perceived insecurity may be a better indicator of the actual situation the worker
is placed in. Although objective insecurity is closely related to subjective insecurity, the latter relates to the psycho-
logical reactions to the worker's job insecurity, which can be affected by personal, organizational, and institutional
contexts (Chung & Mau, 2014; Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984). In other words, the same permanent contract status
may actually entail very different levels of security and, in many cases, negotiative power of the worker across
countries (Chung, 2016), across organizations (de Cuyper, Sora, de Witte, Caballer, & Peiró, 2009), and even across
different workers within the same organization. For the purpose of this study, I define outsiders as workers without
permanent contracts, those in lower (and specific) skill occupational groups, and those who feel that their job is
insecure. I exclude part‐time work from the definition because, in many cases, in Europe, part‐time work is taken
up for voluntary reasons, and due to the limitations in the data, it is not possible to distinguish between voluntary
and involuntary part‐time workers.
2.3 | Outsiders and access to family‐friendly working‐time arrangements
Who gets access to family‐friendly WTAs? Unlike statutory policies, where workers' access to family‐friendly policies
is guided by law, and limiting access may come with legal consequences, provision of occupational level family‐friendly
policies will largely depend on employers. Previous studies (Lambert & Haley‐Lock, 2004; Swanberg et al., 2005) dis-
cuss three principles employers use to decide who gets access to family‐friendly WTAs; namely, need, equity, and
equality. When employers are genuinely interested in addressing the work–family needs of workers, those with the
most family demands or most in need of family‐friendly WTAs are likely to get access. On the contrary, when
employers are more interested in the enhanced performance/outcomes gained from introducing the arrangements
(the principle of equity), the workers who companies believe they will reap more benefit out of by providing family‐
friendly WTAs will have access. Lastly, when the equality principle takes precedence, access to WTAs will be provided
to all workers equally regardless of their care needs or potential performance outcome.
When companies mainly provide flexible WTAs based on the principle of equity, we can assume that outsiders
will be less likely to have access (Swanberg et al., 2005). Employers do not usually invest in the outsider segment
of their labor force. Furthermore, when providing family‐friendly WTAs as an incentive for employees as a recruit-
ment/maintenance tool, employers are less likely to use such arrangements for the outsider segment of their work-
force (Wood et al., 2003) since they are more easily replaceable. Thus I expect that outsiders are less likely to have
access to flexible WTAs (H1).
Empirically, numerous studies show that high‐skilled and higher‐educated workers are most likely to have access
to flexible WTAs (Brescoll, Glass, & Sedlovskaya, 2013; Golden, 2009; Ortega, 2009; Seeleib‐Kaiser & Fleckenstein,
2009). Workers in disadvantaged positions—e.g., low wage, low‐skilled, lower educated—are least likely to have such
access (e.g., Chung, 2017a; Golden, 2009; Swanberg et al., 2005; Wiß, 2017). Similarly, those with fixed‐term con-
tracts have also been shown to have less access to flexible WTAs (Präg & Mills, 2014), although other studies say
there are no significant differences (Chung, 2017a). There is no research to the author's knowledge regarding how
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subjective insecurity relates to access to family‐friendly WTAs. What is more, most of the studies on the division in
the access to family‐friendly arrangements have been single country case studies, leaving the question whether this
division is different across different regimes.
2.4 | Cross‐national variation in the division between insiders and outsiders
Dualization theorists argue that certain institutional configurations make it easier for dual labor market patterns to
emerge (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Palier & Thelen, 2010; Rueda, 2005). Accordingly, the degree of segmentationwithin
the labor market, and the insider/outsider divide, varies across welfare regimes where different protection mechanisms
are in place (Biegert, 2014; Chung, 2016; Schwander &Häusermann, 2013). Scholars (Schwander &Häusermann, 2013;
Yoon & Chung, 2016) also argue that due to these institutional and other social‐economic contexts the groups that are
most likely to be categorized as “outsiders” are different across countries and welfare regimes, as does the degree to
which they are outsiders and insiders. Similarly, I expect a cross‐national variation in the gap between insiders and out-
siders in their access to flexible WTAs (H2).
Which countries are more likely to have a larger access gap of family‐friendly WTAs between insiders and
outsiders? There are no established theories on the variation in the segmentation patterns in the access to
family‐friendly arrangements across countries. Thus I borrow existing theories that examine the broader issue
of variation in the labor markets' segmentation patterns. One key argument maintained by dualization scholars
is that corporatist countries with stronger and centralized unions are those where the division between insiders
and outsiders is largest. According to the power resource theory, the power that is mobilized by wage earners
can influence welfare state development (Korpi, 1989). Similarly, the power of unions may influence employers
in providing family‐friendly benefits at the company level. Several studies have shown that collective bargaining
coverage rates and union density are positively correlated to the provision of family‐friendly WTAs at the com-
pany level (Berg, Appelbaum, Bailey, & Kalleberg, 2004; Lyness, Gornick, Stone, & Grotto, 2012; Präg & Mills,
2014). Further, Palier and Thelen (2010) argue that traditionally strong coordinated unions contributed to the
diffusion, generalization, and institutionalization of good working conditions to the wider population, reducing
inequalities between different groups of workers. Based on this, we would expect a smaller access gap between
insiders and outsiders in countries with strong and centralized unions. However, Palier and Thelen (2010) also
note that, in recent years, in the midst of liberalization and external economic pressures, dualism has been espe-
cially prevalent in these corporatist countries. On the one hand, in corporatist countries unions were successful
in protecting insiders from the pressures of labor shedding strategies through negotiations with employers.
However, they also allowed employers to increase flexibility on the secondary market, exposing outsiders to
increased insecurity in a so‐called “dual reform” (Davidsson & Emmenegger, 2013; Ebbinghaus & Eichhorst,
2007; Palier & Thelen, 2010). Empirically, Biegert (2014) shows how compared to liberal countries such as the
United Kingdom, corporatist countries such as Germany have stronger structural barriers between the insider
and outsider markets, with less mobility between the two markets. Similarly, we could expect that countries with
stronger, more centralized unions, i.e., corporatist countries, to be where the access gap of family‐friendly WTAs
between insiders and outsiders is the largest.
Family policies at the national level may also be relevant in explaining who gets access to family‐friendly
WTAs. The “crowding out” theory argues that national‐level policies will crowd out lower level welfare
engagements (Etzioni, 1995), i.e., companies will not provide company‐level family‐friendly policies when there
are generous policies at the national level. The counter argument to this comes from the “crowding in” theory
(e.g., Künemund & Rein, 1999; Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005), which argues a positive, rather than negative, rela-
tionship between generous national‐level policy and occupational welfare. This can be because institutions, laws,
and policies may put pressure on organizations to become similar to national institutions (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983). The pressure may be in the form of normative isomorphic pressure, i.e., national‐level policies changing
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the norm and subsequent public demand for companies to be more family‐friendly (den Dulk, Groeneveld, Ollier‐
Malaterre, & Valcour, 2013), or mimetic pressure, i.e., where companies imitate or mimic the practices of other
(successful) organizations (Been et al., 2017; Davis & Kalleberg, 2006). Based on this theory, we can expect that
when there are generous national‐level family policies, this will raise the benchmark and change the culture com-
panies operate in, making them more likely to provide company‐level family‐friendly policies. Been et al. (2017)
provide evidence to show that when generous national‐level family policies exist, company‐level family‐friendly
arrangements are also considered as more of a general term of employment, and managers are more likely to
provide the arrangements across the board equally to all workers. Following from this, we could expect not only
better access, but also a smaller division between insiders and outsiders in the access to family‐friendly WTAs in
countries with generous family policies. On the other hand, Chung (2017a) provides evidence to show that
generous national‐level family policies, especially work‐facilitating policies (see also, Korpi et al., 2013; Misra,
Budig, & Boeckmann, 2011) such as childcare provision, “crowd‐in” occupational welfare, but not equally for
all workers. Rather, companies seem to target the more profitable workers, given their added incentive of
keeping and recruiting these workers, resulting in a larger division between insiders and outsiders in countries
with generous family policies.
Lastly, it is important to note that these contexts, family policies, and corporatism/union strength are
correlated. It is thus rather difficult to disentangle which of the variables are the driving factors. In fact,
examining the correlation matrix of the context variables (see the Supporting Information), we can see that
all four context variables are highly correlated. In other words, countries with strong centralized unions,
which are more likely to be corporatist countries, are also those where family policies are generous and
childcare coverage extensive. Thus, I also take a more case‐focused, rather than a variable‐focused, approach




For the purposes of this article, I use the EWCS of 2015. This data is gathered by the European Foundation, and
aims to provide information on a number of dimensions of working conditions for workers across Europe. Individ-
uals across European Union (EU28) and five candidate countries were included. For comparability issues, I use the
EU28 countries plus Norway and Switzerland. A random stratified sampling procedure was used to gather a
representative sample of those aged 15 or over and in employment (a minimum of one hour a week) at the time
of the survey, and was conducted through face‐to‐face interviews. Approximately 1,000 cases are included per
country, with varying response rates. Of the total sample, I restrict the analysis to those in dependent employ-
ment, and further exclude those in the armed forces, and in agriculture/fishery due to the specific nature of these
jobs. Flexible WTAs are used by men and women, as well as those with and without care responsibilities for dif-
ferent purposes (Clawson & Gerstel, 2014), and can also lead to different outcomes (Lott, 2015). Further, the
access gap for flexible WTAs may be different for men and women (Chung, 2018). Thus I only focus on female
workers with care responsibilities. Here, care responsibilities were measured through the following variable: “In
general, how often are you involved in any of the following activities outside work?”: “Caring for and/or educating
your children, grandchildren”, and “Caring for elderly/disabled relatives”. Those individuals who are caring for chil-
dren at least several times a week, and those who are caring for elderly/disabled relative at least several times a
month are considered those with care responsibilities. The analysis further excludes workers over the retirement
age of 65 and excludes all cases with a missing value in any one of the variables in the model results in 7,845
cases across 30 countries.2
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3.2 | Dependent variable
The article examines workers' access to family‐friendly WTAs. The provision of flexitime was measured through
the following question, “How are your working time arrangements set?”, where the workers could answer: (1)
“They are set by the company/organization with no possibility for changes”; (2) “You can choose between several
fixed working schedules determined by the company/organization”; (3) “You can adapt your working hours within
certain limits (e.g. flexitime)”; or (4) “Your working hours are entirely determined by yourself”. Those who answered
(3) or (4) to this question were considered to have flexitime. Second, time off work for personal reasons was mea-
sured through the question, “Would you say that for you arranging to take an hour or two off during working
hours to take care of personal or family matters is...”, where respondents could answer: “very easy”, “fairly easy”,
“fairly difficult”, and “very difficult”. Those who answered the first two were considered to have the ability to take
time off work.
3.3 | Independent variables
The key independent variables in the analysis are workers' contract status, job insecurity perception, and skill‐level
of the worker. Based on the International Labour Organization's definition of skill‐levels (ILO, 2012), and based
on previous studies (Seeleib‐Kaiser & Fleckenstein, 2009; Wiß, 2017), I distinguish those in high general skills
occupations—i.e., (associate) professional, and managerial occupations—from workers in low or specific skills occupa-
tions. Here, for the sake of simplicity, I do not distinguish between low and specific skills. To distinguish between
workers with and without a permanent contract, I used the question, “What kind of employment contract do you have
in your main job?”, where respondents could choose from: (1) “Contract of unlimited duration/permanent”; (2)
“Contract of limited duration/fixed‐term”; (3) “A temporary employment agency contract”; (4) “An apprenticeship
or other training scheme”; or (5) “No contract”. Those who answered (1) to the question are considered as those with
a permanent contract, and all others as those who do not. Lastly, to measure workers' perceived job insecurity, I used
the following question, “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement about your job? ... I
might lose my job in the next 6 months”, where respondents could choose from “strongly agree”, “tend to agree”,
“neither agree nor disagree”, “tend to disagree”, or “strongly disagree”. Those who chose the first two were considered
to perceive subjective job insecurity.3
Based on previous studies (e.g., Chung, 2017a; Wiß, 2017), I included the following variables as controls: age;
whether the respondent lives with a partner; parental status, i.e., whether the respondent lives with a preschool child
under six years of age; whether the respondent lives with a primary school aged child (6–12); respondent's working
hours; whether the worker holds a supervisory role; existence of an employee representative at the company; man-
agement support; gender of the direct manager; gender dominance of the job post; and, lastly, the size and sector
(public vs. private, as well as the line of business, reference group: Commerce and hospitality) of the company the
respondent works in.
At the national level, to measure union bargaining power and structure, union density and collective
bargaining coverage rate are used, both represented as a percentage of wage earners. These variables indicate
bargaining power and to a certain degree corporatism. These variables are from the ICTWSS data set 5.1 and
are for 2013 or the closest year available due to lack of data. Family policies are multi‐dimensional, with very
different labor market outcomes for women (Korpi et al., 2013; O'Connor, Orloff, & Shaver, 1999). Thus this arti-
cle focuses on two different aspects of family policies. First, general generosity of family policies is measured
through public expenditure on family policies as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Second, it focuses
on “work‐facilitating” measures, which have been shown to be most important in explaining mothers' employment
and gender gap (Misra et al., 2011) and in determining workers' access to flexible WTAs (see also Chung, 2017a).
This is measured through the proportion of children using formal childcare for the age group zero to three years.
All data is for 2015 or the closest year available. All context variables have been centered and standardized for the
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models. For more details of the operationalization and descriptive analysis of all variables, please see the
Supporting Information.
3.4 | Method
Random‐slope multilevel regression models are used for the purposes of this article. Multilevel modelling assumes
that the lower level sample—here, individuals—is subject to the influences of groupings (Rasbash, Steele, Browne, &
Goldstein, 2009)—here, countries. In this article, I examine the empty model, before moving on to the multivariate
analysis to see the influence of individual‐ (and company‐) level characteristics that can explain workers' access to
family‐friendly WTAs to test H1. Next, random slopes models are used to test the varying impact of skill, insecurity
and contract status across different countries (H2). A significant variance in the random slope entails that there are
countries where the access gap for insiders and outsiders is significantly different from the average gap found across
Europe. Lastly, I include cross‐level interaction terms with the national‐level variables and the random slope variables
which allow us to see which country level factor can explain the varying access gap across countries. STATA 14.2
meqrlogit is used for the analysis.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Descriptive
First, we examine the percentage of working female carers with access to family‐friendly WTAs across different coun-
tries. As Figure 1 shows, more than a quarter of all female carers have access to flexitime. The Northern European
FIGURE 1 Proportion of female workers with care responsibilities who have access to flexitime across 30 European
countries in 2015
Source. EWCS of 2015.
Note. Weighted averages, excluding agricultural workers and armed forces [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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countries—namely, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway—are champions in their provision of flexitime,
with half or more of all female workers with care responsibility having access to flexitime. Finland, Belgium, the United
Kingdom, and other continental European countries are not far behind, with one‐third of all female carers having
access to flexitime. On the other hand, many southern‐eastern European countries—such as Bulgaria, Greece,
Lithuania, Portugal, Croatia, Cyprus, Romania, and Slovakia—stand out as those where on average less than 10% of
all working female carers have access to flexitime. Examining access to time off work for personal reasons, almost
two‐thirds of all workers across Europe have access (see Figure 2). Again, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Denmark and, to a certain extent, Finland rank high, but now countries such as Latvia, Bulgaria, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom also come out as countries where female carers feel it is fairly easy to take a couple of hours off of work to
tend to personal issues. Again Greece, Slovakia, and Cyprus, but now with the Czech Republic, are where female
carers do not have access to time off during working hours.
4.2 | Outsiders' access to family‐friendly working‐time arrangements
In our next step, we examine whether outsiders' relative access to family‐friendly WTAs depends on workers' labor
market positions. Table 1 shows the multivariate multilevel regression results. High‐skilled female carers are twice
as likely as those with low and specific skills to have access to flexitime, and slightly more likely to have access to time
off work, having controlled for a wide range of factors. On the other hand, there is no difference between permanent
and non‐permanent workers in their access to flexitime or time off work, although for the latter, permanent workers
were slightly more likely to have it (p<0.010). On the other hand, those who feel their job is insecure were significantly
less likely to have access to both types of family‐friendly WTAs, especially for time off work, although the gap was
smaller than that for workers in different skill‐level jobs in the case of flexitime.
In addition, older workers, workers with a preschool child, in supervisory roles, and with management support,
working in financial services, public administration, and other service sectors were more likely to have access to flexi-
time. On the other hand, those working in workplaces which are mostly female, working in small to medium sized pub-
lic companies, and working in education, health and social services sectors—typical female‐dominated sectors—were
less likely to have access to flexitime. Similarly, those in supervisory roles, with management support, working in,
FIGURE 2 Proportion of female workers with care responsibilities who can take time off during work for personal
reasons across 30 European countries in 2015
Source. EWCS of 2015.
Note. Weighted averages, excluding agricultural workers and armed forces [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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TABLE 1 Explaining female carers' access to family‐friendly working‐time arrangements across 30 European
countries in 2015
Flexitime Time‐off work
Odds 95% CI Odds 95% CI
Occupational level (ref: low, specific skills occupations)
Managers/professionals 2.015*** 0.568 0.833 1.106+ ‐0.014 0.215
Contract status (ref: Temporary or no contract)
Permanent 0.901 ‐0.286 0.078 1.144+ ‐0.011 0.281
Subjective job insecurity (ref: feels secure)
Feels insecure 0.804* ‐0.397 ‐0.039 0.760*** ‐0.417 ‐0.132
Age 1.010* 0.002 0.018 1.004 ‐0.003 0.010
Partner (ref: no partner) 1.009 ‐0.125 0.142 1.115+ ‐0.002 0.220
Children in household (ref: no children under 12)
Youngest child <6 1.388*** 0.140 0.516 0.884 ‐0.280 0.035
Youngest child 6–12 1.093 ‐0.068 0.245 0.890+ ‐0.247 0.014
Working hours 1.000 ‐0.006 0.007 0.987*** ‐0.018 ‐0.008
Supervisory role (ref: not in supervisory role) 1.819*** 0.430 0.767 1.268** 0.078 0.398
Employee rep in workplace (ref: no employee rep) 1.045 ‐0.106 0.194 0.937 ‐0.188 0.059
Management support (ref: no support) 1.545*** 0.307 0.564 2.120*** 0.647 0.855
Direct boss woman (ref: boss man) 1.031 ‐0.096 0.157 0.895* ‐0.218 ‐0.005
Gender composition of job post (ref: equally represented)
Mostly men w/same position 0.959 ‐0.262 0.179 1.219+ ‐0.011 0.407
Mostly women w/same position 0.653*** ‐0.558 ‐0.293 0.843** ‐0.287 ‐0.056
Public company (ref: private) 0.766*** ‐0.432 ‐0.103 0.899 ‐0.248 0.034
Company size (ref: 250+)
Micro company <10 0.943 ‐0.251 0.134 1.177* 0.001 0.326
SME 10–249 0.704*** ‐0.490 ‐0.212 1.098 ‐0.026 0.213
Sector (ref: commerce and hospitality)
Industry 1.168 ‐0.069 0.380 1.573*** 0.276 0.630
Transport 0.703+ ‐0.760 0.056 0.973 ‐0.334 0.280
Financial services 2.047*** 0.432 1.001 1.725*** 0.279 0.812
Public administration 2.805*** 0.746 1.317 2.206*** 0.531 1.051
Education 0.693** ‐0.633 ‐0.100 0.910 ‐0.304 0.116
Health social svc 0.747* ‐0.517 ‐0.068 0.896 ‐0.291 0.071
Other services 2.151*** 0.569 0.962 1.978*** 0.514 0.851
Cons 0.109*** ‐2.849 ‐1.586 1.021 ‐0.443 0.484
Variance level 2 1.045*** 0.288 0.302*** 0.085
ICC (empty model) 0.228 0.071
Explained variance level 2 ‐7.6% ‐19.5%
Log likelihood ‐3662.0753 ‐4831.635
Notes.
N level 1 = 7,845.
N level 2 = 30 countries.
***= p < 0.001.
**= p < 0.010.
*= p < 0.050.
+= p < 0.100.
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financial services, public administration, and other service sectors, now alongside those working in industry sectors
were more likely to have access to time off work. In addition, those with a partner, working in micro‐companies,
and those in male‐dominated job posts are more likely to have access to time off work. On the other hand, again those
working in female‐dominated jobs and, interestingly, with female direct bosses, those working longer hours, and
somewhat those with primary school age children, were less likely to have access to time off work. Another thing
to note inTable 1 is that having taken the composition effects into account, the variance across countries in the access
to family‐friendly WTAs is larger.
4.3 | Variance across countries in outsiders' access to family‐friendly working‐time
arrangements
Examining the random slopes models, there was no cross‐country variance in the effect of contract type as well as job
insecurity on the access to both flexitime and time off work (p>0.100 in all cases). In other words, the access gap in
family‐friendly WTAs for those who feel their job is insecure vs. those who do not is relatively stable across all
European countries, as is the lack of division between permanent and non‐permanent workers. The effect of being
a high‐skilled worker on access to time off work is also stable across countries (p>0.100). However, the gap between
workers with different skill‐levels in their access to flexitime varied significantly (p=0.009, with significant reduction in
log‐likelihood). Taking a closer look at the cross‐national variance (Figure 3), in the United Kingdom, the Nordic
(Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark), and some Continental European countries (France, Luxemburg, and
Belgium), the gap between high‐ and low‐skilled workers is large and significantly different from the European
average. On the other hand, in Austria and Malta the gap is significantly smaller, and there is almost no gap between
high‐ and low‐skilled female workers with care responsibilities. Given that the Nordic and Continental European coun-
tries have been noted as the countries with the most prevalent dualization patterns (Palier & Thelen, 2010; Rueda,
2005), the results seem to reflect previous literature which focuses more on labor market insecurity patterns. In
FIGURE 3 Relative odds of female managers' and (associate) professionals' access to flexitime across 30 European
countries in 2015, having controlled for a number of factors included in the model in Table 1
Source. Author's calculations.
Note. Weighted averages, excluding agricultural workers and armed forces [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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addition, with the exception of the United Kingdom, the countries with the larger gap are also those where childcare
and other family policies are relatively generous.
This is confirmed in the next step of the analysis, where I examine the cross‐level interaction terms with skill‐
levels and context variables. Looking at the main country context variable effect inTable 2, we can see that countries
with strong centralized unions—i.e., high collective‐bargaining coverage and high union density, and those with gen-
erous family policies (large family policy spending, and extensive childcare coverage for young children)—are those
where, in general, workers have more access to flexitime. The cross‐level interaction terms show that these countries
are also those where the gap between high‐skilled and lower‐skilled workers is the largest. Of the context variables,
family policy expenditure seems to be the most influential, explaining up to 52% of the cross‐national variance in the
flexitime access gap between high‐ and low‐skilled workers. It remains significant even when other context variables
are included in the model (Model 2–5 and other models available upon request). As shown in Figure 4, countries with
generous family policies at the national level are where both low‐ and high‐skilled female workers with care respon-
sibilities have more access to flexitime. However, this is especially the case for high‐skilled female carers making these
countries those where the largest gaps between workers in different skill‐levels are found. Similar patterns are found
for other context variables (available upon request).
TABLE 2 Multilevel results explaining the cross‐national variance between high‐ and low‐skilled female workers with
care responsibility in their access to flexitime across 30 European countries in 2015
Flexitime / model 2‐1 2‐2 2‐3 2‐4 2‐5
Individual level variablea
Managers + (associate) Professionals
(high‐skilled)
0.558*** 0.538*** 0.539*** 0.566*** 0.557***
Country level variablesb
Collective bargaining coverage 0.501***
Union density 0.385*
Family policy expenditure 0.461*** 0.212




High‐skilled*Family exp. 0.319*** 0.219*
High‐skilled*childcare coverage 0.297*** 0.176+
Constant ‐2.016*** ‐2.088*** ‐2.059*** ‐1.989*** ‐1.987***
Var. random slope 0.217* 0.207* 0.121+ 0.123+ 0.079
R2 random slope 12.8% 16.8% 51.5% 50.7% 68.1%
Log likelihood c ‐3642.2355* ‐3644.3467 ‐3637.2745** ‐3634.8716*** ‐3630.3895***
Notes.
N level 1 = 7,845.
N level 2 = 30 countries.
***= p < 0.001.
**= p < 0.010.
*= p < 0.050.
+= p < 0.100.
aThe models includes all variables included in Model 1 in Table 1.
bAll context variables have been standardized.




This article contributes to the existing literature by providing large‐scale empirical evidence to show workers'
access to one of the most frequented and useful reconciliation tool for working parents, family‐friendly WTAs. It
focuses only on women with care responsibilities, based on the assumption that their demand for reconciliation
policies is different from other workers. The analysis results show that there is a large variation across countries in
the extent to which female carers have access to family‐friendly WTAs. The majority of female carers in Northern
European countries have access to flexitime and time off work for personal reasons, while they are not readily avail-
able for those in many Eastern and Southern European countries.
Further, we see a segmentation pattern between workers in the access to these arrangements. Unlike statutory
policies, occupational policies seem to be only provided to workers where employers have a vested interest and in
better bargaining positions, resulting in a dualized system. Confirming the organizational segmentation and other pre-
vious studies (Lambert & Haley‐Lock, 2004; Seeleib‐Kaiser & Fleckenstein, 2009), I found a division based on the skill‐
level of the worker. However, unlike previous studies, I found that this gap varied across countries. Similar to previous
studies on dualization of labor market insecurity (e.g., Chung, 2016; Palier & Thelen, 2010; Rueda, 2005), it is the
Nordic and continental European countries, with stronger more centralized unions, extensive childcare coverage for
younger children, and high levels of family policy spending, where the division between high‐ vs. low‐skilled workers
is the largest. However, it should be noted that the level of dualization is high in these countries only because of the
very high provision made to insiders. The institutional contexts examined in this article, mainly strong centralized
unions and generous national level family policies, helped both low‐ and high‐skilled workers to gain access to fam-
ily‐friendly WTAs, yet this was especially true for the latter.
FIGURE 4 Relationship between national family policies and the predicted probability of flexitime access for high‐
skilled vs. low‐ and specific skilled female workers with care responsibilities
Source. Author's calculations.
Note. This likelihood takes into account all controls included in Model 1 [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Another major contribution of this article is to show that the most commonly used definitions of outsiders may
not fully capture the actual divisions taking place in the labour market (see also Yoon & Chung, 2016). This may
especially be the case when looking at a wider range of labor market segmentation issues and working conditions. This
article provides evidence to show that it is the subjective insecurity perceptions rather than the objective contract
status that matters in determining access to family‐friendly WTAs especially for time off work. This may be because
since subjective insecurity perceptions are influenced by a wider range of factors, the subjective state may be a better
indication of the (bargaining) position of the individual within the workplace, the (perceived economic) situation of the
company, as well as the general labor market condition particular to the worker. The objective contractual status, on
the other hand, may entail different things depending on the context (Chung, 2016). Future scholars examining labor
market segmentation should thus consider a wider range of definition of segmentation, such as subjective job
insecurity, when examining patterns of divisions in the labor market. Several recent studies (TUC, 2017;
Working Families, 2017) indicate that the fear of negative career consequences and the fear of job loss prohibit
workers from taking up family‐friendly arrangements. This study provides further evidence that those who fear
that they will lose their job are less likely to feel that they have access to family‐friendly WTAs. Policymakers
should thus find solutions to address such fears, and ensure that especially the most vulnerable workers can have
a genuine right to flexible working regardless of their bargaining positions. The recent European Commission pro-
posal for the right to request flexible working for parents4 comes with a mechanism to protect workers from job
losses and discrimination when requesting the right. Such policy structures are crucial in ensuring that all workers
get genuine access to flexible working.
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